Aging is a global phenomenon. Even though there are marked differences in the extent and timing of the aging process across countries, throughout the world demographic processes are characterized by falling mortality rates followed by a decline in birth rates, resulting in population aging. This demographic transition has implication for the sustainability of social security systems such as the pension, health and elderly care system, but also on labor productivity. If older individuals are less productive, an aging working population can lower aggregate productivity, economic growth and fiscal sustainability. Therefore, understanding the age-productivity gradient is key in a ageing society. Focussing on a sample of Gran Prix Formula One drivers, we show that the age-productivity link has an inverted U-shape profile, with a peak at around the age of 30-32. * We would like to thank seminar participants at the University Ca' Foscari of Venice. The usual disclaimer applies.
Introduction
Aging is a global phenomenon. Even though there are marked differences in the extent and timing of the aging process across countries, throughout the world demographic processes are characterized by falling mortality rates followed by a decline in birth rates, resulting in population aging. The European case is paradigmatic. The present 25 EU countries have 18.2 million inhabitants aged 80+, which is 4 per cent of the total population. In 2014 the corresponding number will be 24.1 million (5.2 per cent). About one-third of Europe's population will be aged 60 or over in 2025. The EU population is expected to grow just slightly until 2025 before starting to drop in 2030. This trend is even greater when only the total working-age population (15-64 years) is considered. These demographic changes have aroused considerable anxiety in particular with respect to their implications for the sustainability of social security systems such as the pension, health and elderly care system. An important -yet little investigated -effect of an aging workforce is the potential effect on labor productivity. If older individuals are less productive, an aging working population can lower aggregate productivity, economic growth and fiscal sustainability.
The available micro evidence seems to indicate that the elderly do suffer a drop in productivity. Medoff and Abraham (1980) , (1981) and Waldman and Avolio (1986) use supervisors' rating to measure productivity and show that older workers are less productive than younger ones. These early studies have been important attempts to tackle the issue, but suffer from severe shortcomings. First, being most of these studies based on cross-sectional data, they are unable to disentangle the effect of age from the effect of tenure, and are unable to control for the fact that workers may self-select into firms according to their productivity. Second, supervisors may tend to over-reward senior workers for loyalty and past achievements and therefore supervisors' rating might be only an imperfect proxy for individual productivity. These shortcomings are later addressed in the literature. Stephan and Levin (1998) study researchers in the fields of Physics, Geology, Physiology and Biochemistry. The number of publications and the standard of the journals they appear in are found to be negatively associated with the researchers' age. Similar evidence is found in the field of economics, where Oster and Hamermesh (1998) conclude that older economists publish less than younger ones in leading journals, and that the rate of decline is the same among top researchers as among others. The productivity of individuals doing "creative" jobs, such as authors and artists, is measured by the quantity and sometimes the quality of their output. The evidence seems to indicate that the elderly are less productive. Kanazawa (2003) shows that age-genius curve of scientists bends down around between 20 and 30 years. Similar curves are also found for jazz musicians and painters. These papers share a common feature, the use of piece-rate samples, which provide a clean measure of productivity. However, they cannot easily separate the workers' ability from firm effect and control accordingly for workers selection into firms.
To overcome these problems a number of studies use employer-employee matched data-set. The evidence based on such data-sets, where individual productivity is measured as the workers' marginal impact on the company's valueadded, finds an inverted U-shaped work performance profile (Andersson et al. (2002) , Crépon et al. (2002) , Ilmakunnas et al. (2004 ), Haltiwanger et al. (1999 , Haegeland and Klette (1999) ). Individuals in their 30s and 40s have the highest productivity levels. Employees above the age of 50 are found to have lower productivity than younger individuals, in spite of their higher wage levels. These papers basically estimate the effect of aging on productivity by comparing output (or value added) per worker in plants (or firms) with a different age composition of the workforce. A problem with the fact that most studies on age-productivity differences are based on cross-sectional evidence (with the notable exception of Dostie (2006)) is that reverse causality may be at work: for example, a company's success can increase the number of new employees and lead to a younger age structure, thus a young age structure could be the consequence rather than the cause of a company's success. In order to overcome this problem, this paper casts the age-productivity test in its correct setting: within the worker-firm pair. We rely on a unique data-set, that records the race performances for all Gran Prix Formula One (F1) drivers from 1991 to 1999. The data provide a clean measure of productivity and have enough information to identify the age-productivity profile after controlling for workers and firms characteristics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the F1 industry and data. Identification is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes.
The Formula One Industry
With its 350 Millions TV viewers per race, F1 racing is considered today the most popular sport worldwide. The Auto Club de France held the first Grand Prix race in 1906, but it was not until 1950 that the first World Championship series was held, linking national races in the U.K., Monaco, the U.S., Switzerland, Belgium, France, and Italy. In that year, the form of racing previously called Formula A came to be known as Formula One and became the pinnacle of automotive technology. We believe that there are several features of F1 that make an ideal ground to investigate the age-productivity relationship. First, there are few contexts that provide cleaner measures of performance differences than that of F1 racing. In F1 racing, there are a limited number of racing teams and a limited number of races; in a given year, all of the teams participate in all the races on the circuit. 1 Since all teams are racing on the same racetracks and have cars that must adhere to the same rules, performance differences are easy to measure. Second, although performance is clear after either a race or a racing season is completed, there is a certain degree of uncertainty on how a team is going to perform in either the next race or next season. In particular, given the inherent complexity of F1 cars and given that cars are usually entirely redesigned between seasons, it is uncertain how a new car will stand against competition.
There is a third reason for using F1 racing data, which has to do with the teams seeking constantly to enhance performance by developing their products in collaboration with their suppliers and their drivers. Most of the teams are owned by the world's major automobile manufacturers whose motivation is, at least in part, the exposure to "cutting-edge" technological advances in car design. Unlike other forms of motor-sport, such as Champ Car or IRL where all competitors race in almost identical cars built using standard components, F1 racing teams must design, construct and race their own chassis (for this reason F1 teams are officially called Constructors and a special championship, the World Constructors Championship, is held every year and awarded to the team that scores the most championship points during a racing season). As F1 teams can, and often do, buy the remaining parts of a racing car from external suppliers, a coordination problem for F1 teams emerges both in design and racing of the car. Each F1 team seeks to design a car that it regards as the best compromise of aerodynamic performance, maneuverability, structural rigidity, and engine power within the rules imposed by the governing body of F1, the Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile (FIA). By imposing strict constraints on dimensions, weight, and safety, these rules limit the degrees of freedom in designing a car by taking the interrelations among the various design dimensions to the extreme. For instance, to increase the horsepower of an engine, designers have to consider that the increased heat needs to be dissipated by a redesigned cooling system with bigger radiators and, consequently, an increased weight. Given the constraints in size and weight, other parts of the car need to be redesigned, making sure that the final outcome -a racing car -not only produces the desired performance consistently in every race, but also passes compulsory safety tests.
A fourth reason for focussing on F1 has to do with the role of drivers. Although they are believed to be less important for the final performance than in the past, drivers also play a relevant role in the success of a F1 car. Not only do drivers need to skillfully drive the car during the race itself, but they also need to be involved in the development of a specific car design. Despite the heavy use of telemetry to obtain detailed information on a car's behavior on the track, the driver is still the ultimate provider of feedback to the car's engineers and mechanics. Providing feedback on a F1 car is different than providing feedback on any other racing car. Even drivers considered talented in other racing series need time to acquire this skill. Ultimately, a car's performance is determined not only by a driver's sheer talent, but also by her/his ability to provide feedback. For this reason, every time a team wants to hire a new driver, it tries to find somebody who, in the words of one team owner, "is immediately operational". That is, the team seeks someone who has proven in the past s/he can help the team extract the highest performance from the car.
The identification of the age-productivity gradient requires reliable and repeated measures of productivity over time. Moreover, to partial out individual from firm effects, one has to focus on high turnover industries, where employee change often employers. F1 is the case of an industry where transitions between employers and employee are frequently observed. This provides a further reason to focus on F1. Abowd, Creecy and Kramarz ( (2002)) discuss the groupconnectedness in employer-employee match data and highlight its role in disentangling the firm from the individual effect. Table 1 provides an example of the degree of connectedness provided by the F1 data.
Data are drawn from http://www.formula1.com and http://www.4mula1.ro, which provide information on races, drivers and teams. We sample all races that took place between the 1991 and the 1999 seasons. In each race, performance is measured on the basis of the final position of the car. In our time window, points are awarded to those cars that finish in the first six places. 10 points are awarded for first; 6 points are awarded for second, 4 for third, 3 for fourth, 2 for fifth, 1 for sixth, and 0 for the other placements. Therefore, the sum of points awarded does not grow from race to race and is fixed to 26. This means that in measuring productivity with the points awarded to each driver at the end of the race, one does not need to allow for aggregate effects to capture growth from race to race (or from season to season) in aggregate productivity. This is quite an advantage over measures of productivity based on wages and value added, since both increase (or decrease) over time because of aggregate time effects, not related to aging. 2 Beyond the final position of each car, we also know the time to complete the race. This an equally valid measure of car performance, but con-trary to points it is affected by the aggregate effect on cars' speed of technological evolution.
Each record in our data-set provide car-race level information. Therefore, our data-set contains 3180 observations including all races from 1991 to 1999. For each observation, we have the car, the chassis and the engine numbers; the name, nationality, team, the tenure with the team and the year of birth of the driver; the date of the race, the weather conditions in the day of the race, the country where the race is held, and the track length; the nationality, the assets, the number of employees and the age of the team, the name, nationality and the age of the technical director. Overall, we have data on 89 drivers, 22 teams, 8 seasons, and 16 races per season. Table 2 collects the drivers' names, Table 3 the teams' names, and Table 4 a sample of the variables available for each race in the 1994 season.
Selected summary statistics are provided in Table 5 . The across races mean of drivers scores is just above 1, which hides substantial variability between drivers (1.19) and races (1.99). The age of drivers is on average 29.43 and drivers start driving F1 cars at the age of 25.16. The age of entry in F1 varies across drivers. Esteban Tuero enters at the age of 20, Toshio Suzuki at the age of 38. We observe the entire career of 36 out of 89 drivers, for 30 drivers the career is left truncated, for 17 right truncated and for 6 both left and right truncated. During their careers, drivers change often team: 58 percent of the drivers change team at least once, 36 percent twice, 16 percent three times, 4.5 percent four times, and 2.2 five times. Moreover, Andrea De Cesaris, Eric Van De Poele, J. J. Lehto, Jarno Trulli, Johnny Herbert, Mika Salo change team once in a season, Philippe Alliot twice. Table 5 also contains information on teams and their technical director. F1 teams count on average 146.8 employees, the average age of technical directors is 44.5 and the age of entrance in F1 is just below 30. These variables will be used in the estimation exercise, as we clarify in the next section.
Identification
To identify the effect of age on driver's performances we provide three alternative models. In the baseline model, which we call Model I, we just allow for driver's fixed effect. The estimation of such model would just require panel data on drivers' performance and does not exploit any information on teams. To disentangle teams' from drivers' effect we estimate our Model II, which uses the matched employer-employee structure of the data. Finally, Model III recognizes that the mobility of drivers between teams might depend on match specific effects.
Comparing the three models allows to understand the importance of allowing for drives, teams' and match effects in the estimation of the age-productivity link.
Driver effects
Productivity, as measured by the points awarded to driver i at the end of the race r at time t, is:
where θ i is driver i ability and age irt is the driver's i age in race r at time t. We assume that:
It is immediate to verify that α is identified if:
where t is the calendar date at which race r takes place and t is the the calendar date at which race q takes place, with t > t. Condition (1) requires that E(ε iqt − ε irt |θ i , age iqt , age irt ) = 0. This leads to our first model for drivers performance. Model I can be estimated by regressing y irt on a set of drivers' dummies and age. Notice that drivers can sort into teams according to unobserved individual characteristics. Adding workers fixed effects allows to control for the sorting due to drivers' time-invariant characteristics. However, if the drivers' productivity depends on individual as well as team characteristics, α cannot be consistently estimated in Model I. To understand how this can happen consider the case of a driver that changes team from age t to age t . For such driver, E(ε iqt − ε irt |φ i , age iqt , age irt ) cannot be equal to zero if the performance varies systematically between teams. To account for the effect of the team on drivers' performance we turn to our second model.
Driver and team effects
Model II assumes that the drivers performance depends also on team characteristics that are fixed over time:
where j(irt) is the team to which driver i belongs in race r at time t. It easy to verify that the team effect is not identified if no driver changes team from one year to the other. For driver s, who does not change team between race q and r, the analogue of (1) is:
while for driver m who changes from team j to team k, it is:
Equations (2) and (3) identify the team from the age effects. Model II can be estimated by regressing y ijrt on a set of drivers' and team dummies and age.
Model II provides consistent estimates of the age effects, unless the mobility of drivers between teams depends on a match specific team effect. If that is the case, the estimates of α are not consistent and therefore one needs to add match effects to the model. 3 This leads us to specify and estimate our third model, which accounts for match effects.
Match effects
Allowing for match specific effects on the top of team and drivers effect poses a fundamental identification problem. Since the match effects results from the interaction of the driver and team effects, the model with match, team and driver effects is over-parametrized. Suppose for the sake of exposition that α is equal to zero and that the model is:
where φ ij is the match effect. If E(ε ijrt |θ i , ψ j(irt) , φ ij ) = 0, the sample analog of the expected value (4) is:
where it is assumed that driver i stays with team j for R t races from date τ ij to date τ ij . If the number of matches is equal to M , there are M sample moments like (5). With N drivers and J teams, identification of driver, team and match effects requires recovering from M sample moments, N + J + M + 1 parameters, which is an impossible task. Identification thus requires additional assumptions. There are many alternative identification assumptions. One possibility is to give up on identifying driver from team and match effects. Assuming that drivers' performance changes with age, the model can be written as:
The linearity of the right-hand side of (6) ensures that α can be consistently estimated if one can find a sufficient statistic for the sum of driver, team and match effects. This leads to the following model:
where:
This approach allows to identify the age effect, but is silent about the driver, the team and the match effect. We therefore consider an alternative possibility. Namely, we exploit the richness of our data to model the match effects. In particular, we allow for match effects to depend on drivers' age and assume that they are related to the distance between the age of the driver and the age of the team, and that between the age of the driver and the age of technical director. Furthermore, we assume that the match effects also depend on whether the team and the driver have the same nationality, and whether the technical director and the driver have the same nationality.
These three models do not provide a complete list of all possible models that one can estimate with our data. For instance, with the information at hand it would be possible parametrize the team effects, or to allow for the drivers' performance to depend on whether it rains during the race. These and other possibilities will be considered in the next section.
The age-productivity gradient
We estimate our three models in turn: model I, with drivers' effect only, model II with drivers' and teams' effect, and model III, where we add match effects. The results are reported in table 6 and show that the coefficient on the linear term of age is positive, that on the quadratic term negative in both the baseline and the extended specification, which allows for a list of additional controls including years dummies for 1995-1997, number of entrants in each race, a dummy for rainy weather at the day of the race, the track-length, the number of race-laps, a dummy for whether the race takes place at the drivers' home.
The differences across models and specifications are not sizeable, however we reject the null that the driver and the team effects are equal to zero. The estimates imply that productivity increases by just below half point (0.46) between the age of 20 and 21 in models I and II, and by just above half point (0.52) in model III; and decreases by just below 1/5 of point (0.18) between the age of 34 and 35 in models I and II, and 0.123 in model III. Figure 1 displays the age and productivity profile for the three models, with drivers', drivers' and teams', and drivers', teams' and match effects for the baseline specification. The profiles are obtained by projecting the estimated quadratic polynomial on age: the maximum is reached between age 30-32. The figure thus shows that productivity increases with age, until the age of 30 and decreases afterward. Therefore, GP drivers have an age-productivity profile consistent with that predicted by the theory of human capital. Whether or not this is an artifact of our data is the concern to which we devote the rest of this section.
The list of factors that might lie behind our results is potentially large, even if our estimates allow for driver, team and match effects. At the top of the list, factors that change across drivers and between races (and seasons). For instance, some drivers can be better at racing on wet ground, or on long tracks. Therefore, the change in their performance from race to race might depend on the weather conditions at the day of the race, or on the tracks characteristics, which might confound the effect of age.
We therefore add to our extended specification interaction terms between driver effects and tracks length, driver effects and number of race-laps, and driver effect and a dummy for rainy weather at the race day. The results are reported in Table 7 and are very similar to those reported in Table 6 . Productivity increases by 0.45-0.50 between the age 20 and 21 in all models, and decreases by 0.15-0.21 between the age of 34 and 35.
Controlling for all the interactions between driver effects and race characteristics in the same regressions does not alter the picture. The results are provided in Table 8 , and Figure 2 shows the age-productivity profile. Productivity peaks between the age 30 and 32, and has a concave shape in accordance with human capital theory.
Changes in the rules between seasons might also affect differently different drivers. This is another potential factor that might confound the age effects. For instance, major innovations were introduced in 1994. Refuelling was permitted again with the use of a standardised refuelling rig, the active/reactive suspension systems was banned, and so were the electronic driver aids, such as the traction control, launch control. Moreover, after San Marino accident in 1994, where driver Ayrton Senna died, restrictions imposed on the front and rear wings, the size and shape of the rear diffuser, and a wooden "plank" introduced on the underside of the car to raise the ride hight. We therefore add to our specification the interaction of a dummy for 1994 with the driver effects. The results are reported in table 9 and are again quite similar to those reported in the Tables 6-8. The age-productivity profile is concave and peaks at the age of 30-32, as shown in Figure 3 .
So far we have restricted the age effect to enter the productivity equation in a quadratic fashion. Such assumption is made for convenience. To model more flexibly the effect of age on productivity, we replace the linear and quadratic age terms in Table 9 with a set of age dummies. The results are reported in Table 10 . The baseline category is age between 20 and 22: productivity increases with age until age 32-34 and then starts decreasing. Therefore, allowing for a more flexible specification moves the peaks by around 1 year, but leaves the concavity unchanged. Moreover, as one can see from Figure 4 , productivity increases relatively little at the beginning of the career, and more from the age of 28 until the peak, and it decreases quite dramatically at the very end of the career.
Conclusions
Measuring the age-productivity gradient has both positive and normative implications. The shape of the age-productivity profile has implications for the aggregate productivity, the economic growth, the sustainability of pension systems and the design of tax systems. Moreover, the optimality of wage schemes based on seniority depends on the extent to which productivity decreases at old ages.
The empirical evaluation of the age-productivity link is, however, problematic, in that it requires repeated measures of productivity and possibly employeremployee match data. Data with such features are seldom available. Good proxies of productivity are provided by piece-rate sample, such as those on scientist or criminals. However, such data do not allow to disentangle the the firm and the individual effects on productivity. This issue can be addressed by employeremployee match data, which, however, often lack of convincing measures of productivity. Here, we use very special data, which share the advantages of both the piece-rate and the employer-employer match data: data on GP drivers.
GP drivers change often team in their careers, which makes identification of firm and individual effects possible. Moreover, it is easy to observe their productivity, which we measure as the points awarded to each dirver at the end of each race. This is an objective measure of productivity and is not affected by aggregate growth, since the sum of points awarded in each race is constant over time.
We find that the age-productivity profile is concave and reaches is maximum between the age of 30 and 32. Our result is robust to a number of checks, which control for the fact that there might be factors changing across races (or seasons) which affect drivers differently. Moreover, we show that the productivity increases by around 2.6 points between the age of 20 and 30, and decreases by 2.4 points between the age of 30 and 40. Driver effect Driver and team effect Driver, team and match effect Note. The figure shows the relation between age and productivity, accounting for a full set of interactions between driver effects and track length, number of race-laps, a dummy for rainy weather, and a dummy for season 1994, and modeling the age effect with a piece-wise function. (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** Note. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. One star means 5 percent significant, two 1 percent, three 0.1 percent. The baseline specification contains a quadratic in age and drivers' dummies in Model I, drivers' and teams' dummies in Model II, drivers' and teams' dummies, and the absolute difference between drivers' age and technical directors' age, drivers' age and teams' age (measured as years from the foundation), a dummy for whether drivers and technical directors belong to the same nationality, and a dummy for whether drivers and teams belong to the same nationality. The extended specification adds years dummies for 1995-1997, number of participants to each race, a dummy for rainy weather at the day of the race, the track-length, the number of race-laps, a dummy for whether the race takes place at the drivers'
home. The bottom part of the table shows the F-statistics for the null that the driver effects are zero and the team effects are zero. Each regression contains a quadratic on age, and years dummies for 1995-1997, number of participants to each race, a dummy for rainy weather at the day of the race, the track-length, the number of race-laps, a dummy for whether the race takes place at the drivers' home. Columns headed by 'Track length' interact the driver effect with the length of tracks, columns headed by 'Race laps' interact the driver effect with the number of laps, by 'Rain' interact the driver effect with a dummy for rainy weather. [1995] [1996] [1997] , number of participants to each race, a dummy for rainy weather at the day of the race, the track-length, the number of race-laps, a dummy for whether the race takes place at the drivers' home, and interactions of the driver effect with the length of tracks, of the driver effect with the number of laps, and of the driver effect with a dummy for rainy weather. Table 9 . Age and productivity, changes in the rules Model III drivers', teams' and match effects. Each regression contains a quadratic on age, and years dummies for 1995-1997, number of participants to each race, a dummy for rainy weather at the day of the race, the track-length, the number of race-laps, a dummy for whether the race takes place at the drivers' home, interactions of the driver effect with the length of tracks, with the number of laps, with a dummy for rainy weather, and with a dummy for 1994. [1995] [1996] [1997] , number of participants to each race, a dummy for rainy weather at the day of the race, the track-length, the number of race-laps, a dummy for whether the race takes place at the drivers' home, interactions of the driver effect with the length of tracks, with the number of laps, with a dummy for rainy weather, and with a dummy for 1994.
